

# AN ADMONITIO

*Polit. Pamph. Vol. 41.* T O

My Lord PROTECTOR

AND

His COUNCIL,

OF

Their present Danger.

The means to secure Him and his Po-  
sterity in their present Circumstances.


With the general Applause and lasting Tri-  
umf of the NATION.

LONDON, Printed by J. K. 1654.

LONDON.

Printed in the year of our Lord, 1654.

# DECLARATION



## The Preface.

My Lord,

**M**Y passionate inclinations to the lasting Peace of my Countrey have made me so presumptuous, as to prescribe to your Highness and Council a more perfect remedy for its ill healed wounds, than I have seen yet applied: But I would not be thought so impudent, as to offer at the instruction of so great Masters in the Art of Government, but onely to put you in minde of those things, that the multiplicity of your greater Affairs have made you forget to consider. And lest your Highness should want leisure to peruse the papers of an obscure and unknown person, I thought fit to commit them to the Press; that some of your Council or Friends (at least) may inform your Highness how much is pertinent in them, not doubting but you will think those more your friends, that give you a timely notice of your own and your Countreys danger, than those, who by a servile flattery, becalm you to your ruine; which none shall be more ambitious to prevent, than

My Lord,

Your most humble, and faithfull  
Servant,



J. H.

Printed in the year of our Lord 1641.

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*An Admonition to my Lord PROTECTOR,*  
and his Council, of their present danger, &c.

**T**O begin such a business as this methodically, we are first to shew the just Exceptions the people and Souldiery have to this plausible elective form of Government, so well intended by your Highness and Council; next those to your persons, with the dangers ensuing thereupon to your selves and the Nation: And lastly, the onely means of a totall and lasting prevention.

And I must ingenuously confess, that there is so much seeming reason to preferre the continuall Election of wise and gallant men, before the Succession of Kings or Protectors, who may possibly prove Children, or Fools, or Tyrants, or Cowards, that it may seem a wonder that the experience of all Nations hath not driven them to the specious form of Elective Monarchies.

But the trials they have had, have beaten them to the contrary; for though the renewall of your Highness's many victories & great abilities, with your long & prosperous prepossession of the Generalship, did silence the ambitious pretences of any Competitors in your Election, yet we must no more look for a man that hath no Equals after your Highness; for the most eminent sort of men, are as near of a size in wit and courage, as they are in stature: and as they are equals in virtue, so will they be in interest, at least their factions will be so near an equality, that the weaker in an Army may by his cunning and industry draw in other factions from amongst the people to increase his numbers upon the common specious pretences of a Reformation in Religion and Government agreeable to those peoples humours whom he court; and so prepare himself to decide his pretensions by a Civil War, which I may justly call the great Sea of calamities that swallows up all the streams of other petty tyrannies, as not worth a name, in respect of the ruinous inundations of that many-headed Monster, which commonly ushers in a Forraigner

with it to make our miseries almost immortall.

And that this is like to be our sad fate upon the *Election* of every *Protector*, is as certain, as that all men (whether honest, or dishonest) have naturally an ambition to get as much power as they can to oblige or disoblige; and considering how naturall men overvalue themselves, I think the designs of ambitious men to be commonly just in their own thoughts, out of the confidence they have of themselves, of excellling others in good *Government*. But that those gallant men, who run so many hazards to build up your *Higness* greatness, should not adventure as far for themselves apart, after your *Higness* death, were the greatest miracle that I have known.

And to confirme this by an *antient example* or two, of the wisest and most civilized people then in reputation in the world, we will begin with the great *Alexander*, who at his death (it seems intending an *Election* among themselves) told his great *Officers*, that he would leave his *Empire* to the *worthiest*; but they could so ill agree who that was, that they divided that *invincible Army*, and each seizing upon what he could, fought it out, till they were all destroyed but *Selaneus* and *Ptolomy*: And so after the death of *Julius Caesar*, was the *Roman Empire* rent by the dissentions of *Augustus*, *Anthony*, and *Lepidus*, till the fortune of *Augustus* prevailed. And in the declining of the *Roman Empire* there were severall times as many *Emperours* as the *Legions* in severall *Provinces* were pleased to set up, which were sometimes three or four together for want of a due succession. And to come home to the present *German Empire*, though it be in effect *Hereditary* to the *House of Austria*, yet the very pretense to a free *Election* was the principall Cause of calling in the King of *Sweden*, and reducing that strong and flourishing *Empire* to such a wilderness as now it is. And doubtlesse, all *Governments* were to be rejected as pernicious tyrannies, were it not for avoiding the tyranny of Confusion, which subjects the *Lives* and *Fortunes* of every particular man to any small number of Rogues that shall assemble at such a time of Liberty. If then the *Publick Peace* be the chief end of all *Governments*, those *Forms* must needs be the worst which are most subject to decline to *Factions*, though they doe not immediately doe so; and of *Monarchies* no doubt but the *elective* is most liable to this Confusion.

And

And though it may be objected, that the follies of a weak hereditary King may introduce the same inconveniences, I shall first answer that there is seldome such a King; for their extraordinary educations makes them knowing men, if it findes them not such. But if he be a fool, or coward, he hath Subjects under him fit to command Armies, and no doubt a wise Council of his Predecessors, who knows how to humor and govern him as well as any of his fellow fools; And if he be a child, his minority most commonly proves peaceable, if his Title be unquestionable. But it may be said he may prove a Tyrant, and that I must confess, but so may an Elective Monarch, though he seem a Lamb at his first entry; I am sure he hath more reason to be so, because he hath more of his equals or superiors in birth to fear. And if we look upon other differences of these two kinds of Kings, we shall find the Elective King more necessitated to exhaust the people, both in respect of the charge of gaining & securing his present power, and leaving his posterity like the children of a Monarch, and so the Treasury shall be alwaies emptied into private purses, and the people anew exhausted by the next hungry Prince with his necessitous kindred and dependents. So that I must conclude that every Election doth certainly threaten the worst of evils, and that the inconveniences of a succession are farre lesse, and do very seldome happen by the concurrent of many ill accidents together. And I think this may serve for demonstration of the peoples exceptions, who judge by the pressures they feel. And now lets examine the distaste of the souldiery and people together to your Highness person, and I doubt we shall finde, that the greater their love and admiration once was, the more is now their hatred & your Highness danger; for they both looked upon you as a zealous reformer, not onely of Tyranny, but of the very causes of it; and (though you acted beyond their reason) they thought it was because you had more reason than they; and so with an implicate faith they expected from your Highness such a settlement, as should recompense their great expence of blood & treasure. But after the spirit had moved you to break your Oathes of allegiance and supremacy (which you took with all the Members at your first entrance into Parliament) and after that your trust from the two Houses upon the score of the Covenant; and since again to destroy the King, weed the Parliament; and at last tear it up by the roots, and they in the end see no other fruits of blood.

blood and perjury, but the giving laws like a Conqueror, and imposing that kinde of Government upon the souldiery which they have fought against, and indeed a worse: what can be feared from such a deluded Army and people, but that they should as boldly draw their swords together against a Protector, as the Presbyterians and all sorts of Independents did formerly against the King notwithstanding their own differences in opinion. Certainly they will be as little scrupulous of murdering Monarch by his own law, as one by all the Laws of the Land established, and will think your Highnesse as guilty of the bloodshed of the Nation, as they once thought the King, and there is no question but the people who finde their Taxes and Dangers perpetuated (which were inconsiderable when they first quarrelled with them) will be as forward to assist the souldiery, as they can with them. And I think this generall disaffection of the people was so evident to your Highnesse, before they were exasperated by the death of the King or Parliament, that you need not doubt their unanimous insurrection, if they shall be prepared and countenanted in it, when the people of single Counties ventured their Lives and Fortunes so freely as they did before the Kings death; where it is remarkable, that a remnant of the broken and discouraged people of *Kent*, with some small additions in *Essex*, were able to divert my Lord *Parsons* his Army, *20000* three Months together; if the Nation had been then prepared for a generall insurrection in a day, it is probable your Highnesse Glories had been nipped in the bud, notwithstanding your renowned Victories against the *Scots* at that time. But it may be asked, Why the people did not shew this readinesse when the *Scots*, with their King, came to *Worcester*, and the Answer is, that their coming was unexpected, and in such haste, as shewed they rather came to seek than give protection, and the foresaid designs, if there were any, were (as was then pretended) discovered: But however, there was little more than was requisite for dispersing of Orders between the day of their arrivall at *Worcester*, and that of their defeat.

But the grand Objection is, that the fear of the Common Enemy (the King) will alwaies keep the souldiery at unity in their Obedience under your Highnesse; but I answer, that if a few of them should but resolve to murder your Highnesse, and



one or two more of your principall *Officers*, which no doubt they may easily and securely do, they would find time enough to settle any form of Government they pleased, before the *Common Enemy* (who hath neither *Money*, *Shipping*, *Arms*, nor *Friends* abroad, nor any footing in this Nation) could give them any disturbance. And how farre *zeal* may prompt those, who are *religions*, and the ambition of sharing the Government, those of no *Religion* a wise man ought to feare; but admit the *King* were landed, and considerable, the *Souldiery* very well known by experience, how welcome even particular men are that revolt to an enemy in a doubtfull condition; much more great bodies, which may not onely make what advantagious conditions they please for themselves, but may impose upon him stricter limitations of his power, than your *Highnesse* is now tied to by your *Protectorship*; and no doubt may retaine any places of benefit or strength they shall then be possessed of for security of performance of conditions. But if the worst should happen, that he should come in a Conquerer without their help, they know that a few of the great Ones will onely be punished; for reason will lead any conquering Tyrant (for his own security) to sweeten the multitude with a generall pardon and Act of Oblivion; and for any *scruples* they may have of betraying your *Highnesse Trust*, I doubt they will be wiped away by their apprehensions of your first breaking yours with *King. Parliament*, and *Army*, and so they may probably render you a bloody requital for the destruction of their *Fellow souldiers*, whom you call *Levellers*. Lastly, Consider the fondnesse of the people to their *Old Forms of Religion*, as well as *Government*, which you have abolished without giving the *liberty* to tender *consciencs* they expected, and your *Highnesse* will conclude with me, that the world affords you few others than *Enemies* at home, and *Emulators* abroad: And if I have told you nothing but *truth*, I doubt not but your generosity will think me more worthy of *thanks* than any of your *Flatterers*, especially if I propose a just, safe, and honourable remedy for the *mischiefs* that threaten your *Highnesse* and the *Nation*. And now having sufficiently opened the wounds, I shall apply the promised Cure. And it is not the lessning of your *Highnesse* in any thing, for I am one of those that believe *Monarchy* to be the best forme of *Government*; so as it be hereditary: for admit a *Mo-*

narch be a Tyrant, his Tyranny is mortall, and his care will be greater not to offend, than of a multitude of Governours, who may lay Faults upon one another, and are as subje& to cruelty and avarice as the single person, so that it is better to be preyed upon by one Family with its dependents, than by three or four hundred with theirs, and we may easily please the one, and have justice of him, than of the slow and factions great Body, who must most of them joyn to oblige, and yet any one can by his misinformation disoblige, because the accused shall be branded with the Title of a Malignant, when they have not so much as leisure to heare him. And since an Arbitrary Power will be in all Governments in those that have the possession of the Militia, it is better both for Defence and Offence, that the Generall and Civill Magistrate should be all one, than that a gallant Army and Nation should be ruined, as Hannibal and his Carthaginians were by the delatory and malicious practises of Hanno, a Senator with his faction.

But to returne to our purpose (for the satisfaction of all interests, and first for the Souldery, because they have fought hard for it, I should propose to your Highnesse to have all Officers of the Army, above the degree of Captaines, to have Votes in your Highnesse Councill of State, at those times that they are free from their more urgent employments in the field. So will each Souldier of the Army be sure to endeavour by his extraordinary deserts to rise by degrees to the State preferment he sees his Officers so justly rewarded with.

Then for this next Parliament (though they should not have power to alter the Government) I could wish your Highnesse and Councill would consult with them about your late establishment, and heare what objections they have against it. And if the Parliament and Army should joyn in a petition to this purpose, I presume you would not deny it. And it were better to offer at acts of Grace before they were asked.

Lastly, if my reasons for an hereditary Monarchy be satisfactory, I most humbly beseech your Highnesse and Councill to consider whether the establishment of the succession after your Highnesse in an U'urping line, will not expose the Nation to all the miseries I have mentioned in an Elective government, and if this be doubted, be pleased to look over our own Chronicles, and  
you



you shall finde variety of examples, without going farther than the time of the conquest. For first, *Harrold* by his usurpation encouraged and occasioned the Conquest of *England*; then was there another deluge of blood occasioned by the usurpation of *Henry* the first; and againe what slaughters and rapines did this miserable Nation endure by the unjust ambition of King *Stephen* in detaining the Crown from *Maud* the Empreſse, which fire could not be quenched but by the succession of her Son the right Heire, which was at last agreed to by King *Stephen*. But to come nearer home, you shall finde that *Henry* the fourth saw his Country bleed in his life-time for his usurpation, though he came in with the generall good liking of the people, and thought he had secured himselfe by the Kings murder. But though his industry secured the Crowne to his Son, yet was his Sons death conspired by his principall friends, just as he was setting out for the invasion of *France*; but that conspiracy being detected, he by his unparallel'd vertues, and successes, and the weaknesse of the true Heire, avoided, during his short life, any stormes at home. But they fell most heavily upon our flourishing Countrey in his Successor *Henry* the sixth's time, who could never have lost the Crown by his weakenesse if his title had been good; as appeareth by the notable contention between him and *Edward* the fourth, but between them were many thousands of Orphans and Widdowes left weeping over their own and their Countreys desolate and bloody ruines; and at last the ambition of *Henry* the fourth was justly punished in the ruine of his Grandchild, and a hatefull memory for his unjust Ambition, and the sad consequences of it. But if these examples do not sufficiently convince, the reason of the thing doth; for there will alwayes be a conscientious and a necessitous party for the true Heir in any Nation against an Usurper; besides mille-contents which are still the greatest number because many must necessarily be injured, and more unrewarded that think they deserve it, and even all men that are unconcerned will be for the true Heir, and be pretended lovers of Justice, and with much reason must hate presidents of wrong, lest they should some other time suffer it. And so I may conclude, we are as certain of a Civill warre from an unjust succession as from an Elective Government. And the incomparable miseries and ill consequences of that I have sh-

ready declared, though our own experience might partly have saved me the labour. But your Highness may thinke an invincible Fleet a sufficient security for an Island against a Forraigne Nation, that may interpose, at such a time of our destructions. But I answer, that if none of your shipping should revolt, yet might our next neighbours the French (if they should then make peace with their other enemies) take the opportunity of the same storm that shall force you. Fleet in the Winter into Harbors to blow them over the short passage into *England*, if they have any party to secure their Landing here.

But if this be thought frivolous, I suppose I have said enough besides to make it appeare, that the true interest of your Highness and your posterity, with that of this Kingdome, to thinke of a treaty with *Charles Stuart*, if he will accept of the Crown after your decease upon the same terms you now hold it, I meane the same Councill and limitation of power, with a competent maintenance for him in the mean time, in some such remote place, as you shall need lesse to feare him than you do now, if he should incline to the breach of such an agreement, as may be secured by Oathes, Hostages, and by the mediation of such States, whose interest it is (in respect of their greater neighbours) to be alwayes friends to the peace of *England*, and by stricter ties than are here necessary to be mentioned; besides the honesty, discretion and temper of the young man, who (notwithstanding his great courage) shewes he inherits the mildness of his Father and Grandfather on the one side, and of his Mother and Grandfather on the other side, which great King *Henry* the fourth of *France*, after he had victoriously broken the heart of that great Rebellion called the *Catholique League*, notwithstanding received the only head of it then living, the Duke of *Main* into his protection and favour, and never took the least revenge of him or any other of that Rebellious crew in all the time of his reign. But above all things the Kings own interest and the good of his Countrey will oblige him to bury his resentments. & both to accept and keep such conditions as redeeme him and his followers from misery at the present, and secure him and his posterity in the end to the re-enjoyments of all their rights, without the slaughter or destruction of any part of his Kingdomes, which he is most tenderly sensible of; and what  
doubt

doubt can there be, but that he will rather expect quietly the decrease of an old man (as your Highnesse is) than run an improbable hazard of all his fortunes for a few yeares, which he must have stayed for till his Fathers death, if he had not been untimely cut off; and that he was willing to doe so, your Highnesse knowes, by his pious and earnest solicitation then to you and the rest of the Officers then with you for the saving of his life. And let me adde a very late tryall of him, when *Wiseman* and others proposed your murder to him, he refused to consent to it, notwithstanding his interest, and the exasperation of his wants; how then should he be feared when those motives are taken away?

But admit this were not so, you have still all the power in your owne hands, and would have the affections of the people (which he now hath) if he should be perfidious to their disquiet anew. If then it be cleare that you are secure on the Kings side, where lies the danger of this accommodation? it is the undoubted interest of the military men to be alwayes governed by a Monarch, especially if they be well provided of subordinate places under him, and the people are so passionately affected to the old line, as their onely constant security from rapine and bloodshed, that they will never be at rest till they have an opportunity to destroy the rooter up of that three great fences, of their Religion, Laws, and that unquestionable succession which would intirely secure them from any more disputes; and even most of those, who formerly fancied better forms of Government, are now for falling into the old channell, out of despairs of drawing the peoples affections to their fancies, without which they know the peace of the Nation can never be long preserved; if your Highnesse should yet prove one of that number, your name would be as good as it is great; for a man may be thought reasonably to undertake indirect courses for a great and publick good, so as he leave those courses when he sees his end is not to be compassed: And if your Highnesse do so, your curses will be turned into praises, and you may sleep againe without any feare of your own guards, who otherwise are not like to scruple the murdering of so unjust a Master for a greater reward than you can give them, if the present seizure of your treasure were not sufficient for them: For men of no Religion will at any time betray a person as wicked as themselves for their interest, and those that are zealous will do the same upon the score of Justice, and their Oathes and Cove-

nants to other forms or persons; so that your *Highness* can be secure of no body, nor any thing, but the rewards of *injustice* with infamy, for the preferring your *Sons advancement* before your *Countrys security*, who if he were planted can never be secured by any *Decrees* or *Oathes*, since both have been so commonly broken, and ought to be so, if unjustly made or taken; and if his virtues be never so great his meer youth shall make him be despised by those that have had the start of him in *successes*, and the *affections* of the *Army*; and the seeming respect that is now paid him upon your *Highness* score, shall vanish with your *death*, and all your *Family* be destroyed (like that of the great *Alexanders*) by your own friends and followers, if you your self should escape such a cup of poyson as he met with on such a dagger as finished the ambition of *Julius Caesar*: And now my Lord, for a Conclusion, give me leave to wonder at the ambition of all ill men, though they believe in no other world, since their ambition is to gaine esteeme, and how they should be esteemed and hated at once for the same fact, I know not, without a contradiction. If they did but consider how even wicked men hate one another for feare of receiving the same injuries from their companions which they have inflicted together upon others, they would prefer the love and admiration of Mankind before the being admirably hated, which since your *Highness* may so easily doe, and cannot with justice, honour and safety doe any thing else, it shall no more be doubted from your generosity by

MY LORD.



